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Abstract 
We develop a location analysis spatial model of firms’ competition in multi-
characteristics space, where consumers’ opinions about the firms’ products are 
distributed on multilayered networks. Firms do not compete on price but only on 
location upon the products’ multi-characteristics space, and they aim to attract the 
maximum number of consumers. Boundedly rational consumers have distinct ideal 
points/tastes over the possible available firm locations but, crucially, they are affected 
by the opinions of their neighbors. Proposing a dynamic agent-based analysis on 
firms’ location choice we characterize multi-dimensional product differentiation 
competition as adaptive learning by firms’ managers and we argue that such a 
complex systems approach advances the analysis in alternative ways, beyond game-
theoretic calculations.  
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1.  Introduction 
Product characteristics are typically considered as given when economists study 
firms’ strategies and behaviour. But firms in industries with product differentiation 
actually choose the features of their products based on consumers’ preferences. The 
role and effects of the demand side in product differentiation processes have been 
neglected by the relevant literature (Coombs et al., 2001; Mueller et al., 2015) and 
only recently have started to receive attention (Andersen, 2007). The importance of 
consumer behaviour in shaping markets’ properties is oversighted and in most cases 
the simplistic perspective of perfect rational homogeneous agents is implicitly 
adopted in the literature (Valente, 2012). Among the works highlighting the relevance 
of demand for the emergence of new products, Witt (2001), Saviotti (2001), Malerba 
et al. (2007), Windrum et al. (2009), Nelson and Consoli (2010), Valente (2012), 
Markey-Towler and Foster (2013), Mueller et al. (2015), Markey-Towler (2016) and 
Schlaile et al. (2017) can be included. However, no attention has been paid to 
advancing a generalized evolutionary model of demand for the effect of consumers’ 
social networks on their consumption decisions and, in turn, on firms’ process of 
developing new characteristics for their products.  
The aim of this paper is to address this gap in the literature by suggesting a way to 
understand the relevance of consumers’ social networks in shaping demand behaviour 
in such markets, which in turn frame the process of product-embodied innovations. 
We do so using complex networks, which mathematically are described by graph 
objects. We develop a stylized computational model to examine the issue of product 
differentiation in a multi-dimensional space with consumers’ choices emerging from 
consumers’ opinion-based multilayered networks. The model that we propose is 
designed to analyze and illustrate potential effects of consumers’ heterogeneity, 
particularly regarding their preferences, their bounded rationality and the role of their 
social networks on the development of new product characteristics. We ask two 
questions: First, how consumers’ social networks affect their decisions on which 
products to buy and how this decision leads to market-share inequality at the firm 
level? Second, how firms respond to these decisions by developing new 
characteristics for their products defined over a multidimensional characteristic 
space? 
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Assuming that bounded rational consumers with heterogeneous preferences can have 
an active role in the product-embodied innovation process, and studying the influence 
of a change in their purchasing opinion over time due to their participation on social 
networks calls for new modelling approaches, namely complex systems analysis and 
agent-based simulation techniques (Pyka and Grebel, 2006; Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007; 
Gilbert, 2008; Farmer and Foley, 2009; Tubaro, 2011; Schlaile et al., 2017; Muller, 
2017). Agent-based simulation approaches focus on the rules and elements that 
constitute a system and the interactions of the players/agents within the system and 
have gained increasing momentum in many scientific disciplines (Schlaile et al., 
2017; Mueller and Pyka, 2017; Vermeulen and Pyka, 2016; Namatame and Chen, 
2016; Hamill and Gilbert, 2016; Boero et al., 2015; Wilensky and Rand, 2015; de 
Marchi and Page, 2014; Kiesling et al., 2012). In our case, through agent-based 
simulation we are able to account for the economic agents’ heterogeneity and the 
related implications of their interactions by representing the economic system in a 
more realistic fashion overcoming the simplistic models limited to representative 
agents (Bonabeau, 2002; Macal and North, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014; Page, 2011; 
Schalaile et al., 2017).  
The agent-based simulation model described in this paper is based on the works by 
Laver, (2005), Laver and Sergenti (2011), Valente (2012), Markey-Towler and Foster 
(2013), Halu et al. (2013), Mueller et al. (2015), Schlaile et al. (2017), Muller (2017) 
and represents a first attempt to address the issue of neglected consumers’ social 
networks in the process of developing new products. In particular, we focus on the 
effects of heterogeneous and boundedly rational consumers’ social networks on firms’ 
multi-dimensional product differentiation competition.
2
 Our model captures only parts 
of the consumers’ demand-side, namely ‘consumption as voting’ (Dickinson and 
Carsly, 2005; Shaw et al., 2006; Moraes et al., 2011) whereby consumers choose 
which firms/suppliers and new products/services to support.
3
  In this sense, our model 
could also apply to political competition, as studied by Downs (1957) and many 
others after him. More specifically, it could be perfectly placed within the scope of 
                                                 
2
 Illuminative for the reader might be the work by Markey-Towler (2016) who develops a very 
interesting general theoretical model of market dynamics in the field of evolutionary economics that 
elaborates the process of firms’ competition for market-share on the basis of both prices and product 
characteristics. 
3
 See also Schlaile et al. (2016) and Schlaile et al. (2017) for a thorough discussion on possible 
ways/domains that consumers take an active role in the process of developing new product 
characteristics.   
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agent-based models described in Laver and Sergenti (2011). However, in this work 
we will stick to the firm affairs’ language.  
In more detail, what we propose here is a multi-dimensional agent-based model of 
firms’ locational choice in the product-characteristics space that describes a finite 
number of firms competing for customers.
4
 This model is inspired by the New 
Consumer Theory literature dealing with the non-price aspects of consumer behaviour 
(Lancaster, 1966, 1971, 1975, 1979; Ironmonger, 1972; Ratchford, 1975; Earl, 1983, 
1986) and has its roots in the behavioral economics literature having to do with 
boundedly rational consumers making decisions under the presence of multiple 
attributes (Selten, 1998). From consumers’ perspective, we begin with a very basic 
idea. Consumers’ decision on purchases cannot be different from most other decisions 
people make in their daily lives, in the sense that some process for acquiring 
information and evaluating it is necessary. The model also allows for heterogeneity of 
demand based on heterogeneous consumers having individual preferences for the 
particular characteristics of the products, like the colour, the size, the brand, the shape, 
their functionality etc.: consumers have preferences that place them on their ideal 
points in a multi-characteristics space.
5
 For every firm we model the network of 
consumers’ opinions about its product (i.e. for every firm there is a corresponding 
opinion network describing consumers’ opinion about the firm’s product: the nodes 
represent the consumers and a link between two nodes represents their exchange of 
opinion about the corresponding firm’s product), on which (opinion network) a 
contagion dynamics can take place.
6
 Consumers are represented on every network and 
can be active only in one of the networks (purchase of one product from one firm) at 
the end of a given time period (at the moment of the purchase). Each consumer has 
also the option not to purchase, and in that case she will be inactive in all networks. 
Before the end of each time period, and while the consumers think about the purchase, 
they are more likely to change opinions and examine different options. They have 
some form of product characteristics expectations at the beginning, which is reflected 
                                                 
4
 Other firm-level models of multidimensional product choice within the agent-based framework are, 
for example, Page and Tassier (2007), Babutsidze (2015). For models on product innovation see also 
Windrum and Birechenhall (1998), Chen and Chie (2005, 2007), Klette and Kortum (2004), Marengo 
and Valente (2010), Ciarli et al. (2010), Lorentz et al. (2016), Acemoglu et al. (2013), Georges (2015).  
5
 Other models simulating a multidimensional characteristics space are, for example, Saviotti and 
Metcalfe (1984), Saviotti (1996), Gallouj and Weinstein (1997). 
6
 See also Rauch and Casella (2001), Dutta and Jackson (2003), Earl and Potts (2004), Granovetter 
(2005).  
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by their position in the product characteristics space, but their decision on which 
product to purchase is crucially affected by the opinion of their peers: at the time of 
the purchase, they tend to be active in the network where the majority of their peers 
are also active.
7
 In addition, as they gain experience and acquire more information 
about the products, their opinion can change, but it stabilizes over time (see Hoeffler 
and Ariely, 1999; West et al., 1996). This “uncertainty reduction”, reflecting both 
consumers’ learning and changes in their environment, is captured by dynamics that 
slow down until the purchase moment when they become completely frozen. These 
dynamics are implemented in this work with the simulated annealing algorithm.
8
 An 
illustration of a possible final configuration of the described system is shown in 
Figure 1. 
At the end of the simulated annealing calculation we have the number of consumers 
that opt to purchase from each firm. This is affected by the average connectivities of 
the consumers’ opinion networks. Hence, we observe “regions” in the average 
connectivity space where the active nodes belonging to some opinion networks with 
high average connectivity percolate the system, while nodes of the remaining opinion 
networks with lower average connectivities are concentrated in disconnected clusters 
indicating high market share inequality. Nevertheless, “regions” where the average 
connectivities of the consumers’ opinion networks are comparable manifest a market 
that sustains low market share inequality (see also Halu et al., 2013).  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study that incorporates the role of 
opinion exchange and processing on a multilayered network, in an attempt to shed 
light on how the market-share inequality and the competition in a multi-characteristics 
space are affected by the presence of consumers’ interactions.9 Taking into account 
these multiple layers is crucial, as the considerable interest in various multilayered 
systems demonstrates (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Vespignani, 2010; Parshani et al., 2011; 
Baxter et al., 2012; Bashan et al., 2012; Gomez et al., 2013; Radicchi and Arenas, 
                                                 
7
 Two consumers are peers when there is a link between them, i.e. when they exchange opinions. 
8
 An early application of the simulated annealing in economics is the work of Goffe et al. (1994) who 
suggested that simulated annealing could be used to optimize the objective function of various 
econometric estimators.  
9
 A few papers consider location models where consumers are distributed on a graph. Mavronicolas et 
al. (2008), Feldmann et al. (2009), Nunez and Scarsini (2015), Fournier and Scarsini (2014) consider 
Hotelling models on graphs studying some very interesting properties of the economic system at the 
firm-level. See also Markey-Towler (2016) for a model that could possibly be expanded to make 
demand contingent upon consumers’ interactions. 
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2013; De Domenico et al., 2013; Radicchi, 2014; Garas, 2016). On the other hand, to 
make significant advances in understanding consumers’ decisions, we must device a 
method for studying this process. Such method would allow us to observe consumers’ 
behaviour from up close, to dig below the surface and watch consumers as they try to 
exchange information about a myriad of alternative products while refining the 
overwhelmingly volume of information of their multiple characteristics. Behavioral 
decision theory guides the process-oriented, complex systems-framework we present 
in the next sections in an effort to develop a new set of measures for studying market 
proceedings. The results reported in the subsequent sections are intended to 
demonstrate that such a realistic complex systems approach provides a plausible basis 
for understanding market-share inequality and firms’ competition in the product-
characteristics space and can advance the analysis of these topics in interesting and 
alternative ways, beyond game-theoretic calculations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the agent-based model 
(ABM) is introduced, section 3 gives the simulation strategy and discusses the 
simulation results and section 4 concludes. 
  
2.  The market as a complex system 
Following Markey-Towler and Foster (2013) and the relevant literature (Potts, 2000; 
Schweitzer et al., 2009; Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Jackson, 2010), at any point in 
time t , the market is represented by a graph of a set of consumers and a set of 
products/firms, tG , and the relationships between them represented in ( )t tl G  
 
 { , ( )}
t
s t t tE G l G                                                                             (1) 
 
Where 𝐺𝑡 = {𝑔𝑖: 𝑔𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑘} 𝑔
𝑖=1
 is the set of economic agents on the product-
characteristics space ℝ𝑘 and ( ) { }t t ij tl G l  is a g g  matrix that summarizes the 
connections between the economic agents, where, if ,
t
i j sl l E  denotes the existence 
of a connection between economic agents i  and j , then 
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In this system there are two subsets of economic agents, consumers, 𝐶𝑡 = {𝑐𝑖: 𝑐𝑖 ∈
ℝ𝑘} |𝐶|𝑡
𝑖=1
, and  firms, 𝐹𝑡 = {𝑓𝑖: 𝑓𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑘} |𝐹|𝑡
𝑖=1
. We consider 
t
F  competing firms for 
which 
t
F  different opinion networks exist. These opinion networks represent the 
different opinion exchange patterns of consumers for the different 
t
F  firms. For 
example, two consumers may exchange their opinions for firm A but not for firm B, 
hence there is a link between them apparent in opinion network A but not in network 
B. Suppose that in every period each consumer i  is represented in each network and 
must make a decision on buying a product from a firm, hence to stay active in one of 
the 
t
F  opinion networks. For simplicity, let us assume ( ),i j t t i j tf f l G f f G   , thus 
omitting relationships between the different opinion networks.
10
 In this market, the 
earnings of firm j  immediately follow from the number of active consumers (nodes) 
in opinion network j  at the end of any given period t, since any active node in 
opinion network j  at the end of period t represents a purchase from firm j .11 
Furthermore, the number of active nodes in each network is determined by the tastes 
and choices of each of the consumers in the market and following Simon (1955) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) we explain below the process of these choices 
assuming bounded rationality.   
 
2.1 Consumers’ behaviour 
Traditionally the assumed heuristic for consumers is a maximization rule over some 
utility function defined over the set of products’ quantities. However, this rule is 
inconsistent with extensive evidence presented in behavioral economics and 
marketing literature. Here we assume that each consumer’s preferences can be 
characterized by an ideal economic position in some k -dimensional product 
                                                 
10
 We assume that all consumers buy in the equilibrium (covered market is a quite standard assumption 
in the literature, e.g. Irmen and Thisse, 1998), where price is exogenously given. Firms do not compete 
on price but only on location. 
11
 We assume that any product may be produced at the same constant marginal cost, which is 
normalized to zero without loss of generality. 
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characteristics space, and we look closely on the decisions made by consumers when 
choosing which firm’s product to buy. Having switched from formal analysis to 
computation, we depart from the classical analytically tractable models first, by 
assuming as baseline decision rule that consumers are affected by the opinion of their 
peers and second, by making the appropriate behavioral assumptions following the 
relevant literature of behavioral economics, discussed below. 
Behavioral decision theory is psychological in its orientation, beginning with the view 
of humans as limited information processors or, perhaps more accurately, as 
“boundedly rational information processors” (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1959). 
Humans have developed a large number of cognitive mechanisms to cope with the 
overwhelming volume of information in the modern societies. These mechanisms are 
adopted automatically without any conscious and are cognitive shortcuts for making 
certain judgments and inferences with considerably less alternatives than those 
dictated by rational choice, focusing attention on a small subset of all possible 
information.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1974, 1984) and Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974) 
have identified three general cognitive heuristics that decision makers adopt in the 
process of information gathering and analysis: (a) decomposition, which refers to 
braking a decision down into its component parts, each of which is presumably easier 
to evaluate than the entire decision; (b) editing or pruning, which refers to simplifying 
a decision by eliminating (ignoring) otherwise relevant aspects of the decision; (c) 
decision heuristics, which are simplifying the choice between alternatives thus 
providing cognitive efficiency.  
These heuristics have direct application to consumers’ choices. Consumers face a 
myriad of alternative products and there is compelling evidence which suggest that 
consumers simplify their decisions with a consider-then choose decision process in 
which they first identify a set of products, the consideration set, for further evaluation 
and then choose from the consideration set. In seminal observational research Payne 
(1976) identified that consumers use consider-then-choose decision processes. This 
heuristic is firmly rooted in both the experimental and prescriptive marketing 
literature (e.g. Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker, 1996; Brown and Wildt, 1992; 
DeSarbo et al., 1996; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Jedidi et al., 1996; Mehta et al., 
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2003; Montgomery and Svenson, 1976; Paulssen and Bagozzi, 2005; Roberts and 
Lattin, 1991; Shocker et al., 1991; Wu and Rangaswamy, 2003). 
In the context of our model, this means that the set of alternatives each consumer, i , 
considers, 
t
iB , is a subset of the overall set of firms/products in the system. So we can 
define the consideration set for consumer i  as 
 
𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = {𝑓𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑡 ∖ ‖𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖‖ ≤ 𝜀} = {𝑓𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝑡 ∖ 𝑧𝑖
𝑡(𝑓𝑗) = 1} ⊂ 𝐹𝑡                    (3) 
          
where 𝑧𝑖
𝑡 is a mapping which assigns elements in the overall set of alternatives 𝐹𝑡 to 
either the consideration set or not, so 𝑧𝑖
𝑡: 𝐹𝑡 → {0,1}, such that 𝑧𝑖
𝑡(𝑓𝑗) = 1 indicates 
that the firm/product j  is considered by consumer i  at the beginning of period 𝑡. 
 
2.2 Consumers’ networks 
At the beginning of time period t  we consider 
t
F  networks, representing the 
consumers’ different opinion exchange patterns for the 
t
F  competing firms. During 
the time period t , each consumer i  is represented in 
t
i
B  networks and can be active 
in any of these networks. In particular, ( ) 0
t
i jb f   if consumer i  is inactive in 
network j  and  ( ) 1ti jb f   if consumer i  is active in network j . At the end of time 
period t , the activity of a consumer in network j  corresponds to the consumer’s 
purchase of firm j  ‘s output, hence each consumer can be active only on one of the 
t
i
B  networks on the purchase moment (i.e., if ( ) 1
t
i jb f   then ( ) 0 for 
t
i mb f m j  ). 
Nevertheless we leave to the consumer the freedom not to make a purchase (i.e., 
1 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) 0 t
i
t t t
i i i B
b f b f b f    ). Moreover, consumers are influenced by their 
network peers, hence we assume that, on the purchase time, if the majority of 
consumer i ’s peers are active in network j , the consumer will be active in the same 
network j , provided that she is not already active in another network.  
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Based on the above discussion and following Halu et al. (2013), the 
t
i
B  
mathematical constraints that consumer i ’s preferences need to satisfy at the end of 
period time t  are: 
  
1( )
( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( )),      for     1,2...
t
i
t
ij
B
tt t t
i j j i k i
kNb c
k j
b f b f b f j B
 

 
     
 
 
       (4) 
 
where ( )
j
t
iNb c is consumer i ’s network where she exchanges opinion with other 
consumers about firm j . Though we assume no buyer’s remorse, we allow for some 
conflicts in the system before the purchase time, in the sense that the 
t
i
B  constraints 
provided by equations (4) will not be satisfied. The behavioral literature points out 
that consumers face an “uncertainty reduction” to the choice of the product they will 
purchase as the purchase time comes closer. The agents change and adapt their 
behaviour over time, reflecting both their own learning and changes in their 
environment. When they think of a purchase, initially they are more likely to change 
opinions and examine different options. They have some form of opinion at the 
beginning, but as they gain experience and acquire more information, their opinion 
changes and stabilizes over time (see Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999; West et al., 1996). 
This “uncertainty reduction” is captured by dynamics that slow down until the 
purchase time when they become completely frozen. These dynamics are 
implemented with the simulated annealing algorithm.  
 
2.3 Evolution dynamics during consumers’ purchasing process 
To model how consumers decide during the time period t  we consider the following 
equation (5) that counts the number of the constraints in equations (4) that are violated 
(Halu et al., 2013): 
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2
1 1 1( )
( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
tt
ii t
t
ij
BB C
t t t
i j j i k
j i kNb c
k j
H b f b f b f
  

     
        
       
                     (5) 
 
Initially, active nodes in each network j  are distributed according to consumers’ 
consideration sets [equation (3)], and we allow the consumers to change opinion at 
any time before they make their final choice. These dynamics are implemented using 
the simulated annealing algorithm, which works as follows. Starting from a relatively 
high initial temperature, T,
12
 i.e. a large number of potential conflicts [a large-number 
of non-binding constraints given by equations (4), hence a high H given by equation 
(5), which means that before the purchase time, consumers can be active in more than 
one network, i.e. they can have positive opinion for more than one firm/product] due 
to the stochastic way initial opinions are distributed, we use a Monte Carlo dynamics 
which will reach an equilibrium following the equation (5). As the time for the final 
choice approaches, i.e. as the simulated annealing progresses, the effective 
temperature T decreases and the consumers tend to have less and less opinion 
conflicts with their network peers until they reach to zero conflicts at equilibrium, 
when 0H  .  
At the end of the simulated annealing calculation we will have the configuration of 
the model for the period t , which is depicted in Figure 1. In this final configuration, 
each consumer can be active only on one of the 
t
i
B  networks or she can be inactive 
in all networks (no purchase). Hence, we will have “regions” in the average 
connectivity of consumers’ opinion networks space where the active nodes of some 
networks will percolate the economy, while the nodes of the remaining layers will be 
concentrated in disconnected clusters indicating high market share inequality (since 
the active nodes in each network represent the respective firm’s customers). 
Nevertheless, “regions” where the average connectivity of the opinion networks will 
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 Since we start with a sufficiently high temperature, the dynamics are not affected by the initial 
conditions of the system. 
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be comparable manifest a market that sustains low market share inequality (see also 
Halu et al., 2013).
13
  
 
2.4 Firms’ ‘behaviour’ 
Following Laver and Sergenti (2011) we assume that firms’ managers use an adaptive 
decision rule to set product characteristics on a multidimensional product-
characteristics space at any given period t . We assume an adaptive rule that models a 
manager who constantly modifies product characteristics in the search for more 
customers, and the manager cares only about the firm’s market share. If the manager’s 
decision for the characteristics of the product at time 𝑡 was rewarded by an increase in 
market share, then the firm makes a unit move at time 𝑡 + 1 in the same direction as 
the move at 𝑡. If not, the manager reverses direction and makes a unit move on a 
heading randomly selected within the half-space being faced now. In other words, the 
firm’s manager relentlessly forages in the product-characteristics space, always 
searching for more customers and never being satisfied, changing strategic planning 
in the same direction as long as this is rewarded with more sales, but casting around 
for a new strategic planning when the previous one was punished with falling or static 
sales. 
Now that we have structurally defined the evolution process of the complex system as 
a whole, we can proceed to simulations.  
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 These results arise intuitively -and are confirmed by our model- from the percolation theory on 
networks literature (see Newman, 2010) and the recent results concerning the role of densely connected 
social networks on the adoption of a behavior (see Centola, 2010).  
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Figure 1: Illustration of the system’s final configuration  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) Layer 1 represents consumers’ opinion network for firm B; Layer 3 represents 
consumers’ opinion network for firm A; Layer 2 is the (2-dimensional) product-characteristics plane; 
Each consumer is represented in all layers but can be active either in the firm B’s underlying opinion-
network (blue node) or in the firm A’s underlying opinion-network (red node) or inactive in both 
networks (white node). 
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Figure 2: Overview of the evolution of the system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SETUP 
Create consumers and firms 
Randomly (drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 
1 radius of space) assign 2-dimensional positions to all agents 
For each firm, setup a respective consumers’ opinion network that follows Poisson degree 
distribution 
 
PROCESS 
CONSUMERS ADAPT 
Setup 
Set up the consideration set for each consumer 
Process 
Start at temperature T =1 and minimize equation (5) 
using the simulated annealing algorithm 
 
Consumers’ final configuration 
0H   (no conflicts in the system) 
SYSTEM UPDATE 
Count active nodes in each network 
 
FIRMS’ MANAGERS ADAPT 
 Was previous move followed by increased sales? If yes repeat move. 
If no, turn 180
o
 from direction of last move and make unit move in direction 
randomly selected from arc 90
o
 either side of direction now faced 
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3. Simulations 
For clarity in what follows we consider two firms, hence two layers in the consumers’ 
opinion network, in the simulation experiments. Though, our code can be 
straightforwardly generalized to consider multiple firms/networks. In our setting, 
consumers are assumed to be intrinsically interested in product characteristics and to 
have ideal points in a product-characteristics space (again, in order to aid 
visualization, the simulated version of the model is implemented in two dimensions, 
i.e. in the Euclidean plane, but the model can be implemented in any number of 
dimensions). Firms compete with each other by offering products with varied 
characteristics to consumers. Figure 2 summarizes the model and its evolution 
process, which was programmed in R.  
 
3.1 Firm System Dynamics 
Initiation of the model randomly distributes a discrete set of firms’ locations and 
consumers’ ideal points across the product-characteristics plane.14 Consumers are 
initially present and active in the opinion-networks/firms which lie within their 
consideration sets. As discussed above (see section 2.3),  we allow the consumers to 
change opinion at any time before they make their final choice, and we model their 
dynamics using the simulated annealing aiming to reduce to zero the number of 
conflicts with their network peers (the number of violated mathematical constraints 
given by equation (4) for all consumers) when reaching equilibrium. More precisely, 
following Halu et al. (2013), the algorithm starts with an initial temperature 1T   and 
at every time step we select a node at random from either one of the two networks 
with equal probability and we change it from active to inactive or vice versa. After 
this change, the equation (5) is recalculated, and if the difference with respect to its 
previous value, H , is negative i.e., the number of conflicts in the system is reduced, 
the change is accepted. If 0H  , the change can still be accepted but with a small 
probability given by e
-ΔΗ/kT
. This random selection process is repeated 2N time steps, 
in order to update the whole system on average once and then we advance the system 
time by one Monte Carlo step. The whole process is repeated by slowly reducing the 
                                                 
14
 We assign 2-dimensional positions to all agents, drawn from a bivariate random normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation one radius of space. 
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temperature until we reach equilibrium at 0H  , where there are no more conflicts in 
the network. The final configuration of the “uncertainty reduction” process just 
described is depicted in Figure 1. 
We assume that consumers can share opinions with others randomly, therefore the 
consumers’ opinion networks follow Poisson degree distributions, i.e. they fall in the 
class of Erdos-Renyi random networks (in the top panel of Figure 3 we illustrate how 
these networks look like for different average degrees). Using average degrees above 
the percolation threshold, we visualize the evolution of the giant component against 
the average degree of the network (see Newman, 2010). In the bottom panel of Figure 
3 the final configuration of the two-firm model for different average-degrees of 
consumers’ opinion networks is shown. In particular we contour-plot the difference 
between the total number of customers of firm A (total number of nodes active in 
network A) and the total number of customers of firm B (total number of nodes active 
in network B) as a function of the average connectivities of the two networks, 
A
k  
and 
B
k  respectively.15  
The simulation results visualized in Figure 3 are in accordance with the findings of 
Halu et al. (2013) and imply that the firm with the most connected customers gets the 
lion’s share of the market: 
- Case 1: In the regions where the mean degree of both networks is smaller than 
one, there are no giant components in the networks. This means that the 
networks are fragmented and the opinion of a consumer is not affected by peer 
opinions. In this case each firm possesses only a marginal market share and 
noticeable market share inequality is unlikely.  
- Case 2: In the regions where the mean degree of either one of the two 
networks is smaller than one and for the other network bigger than one, the 
giant component in the latter network emerges and market share inequality 
occurs. 
                                                 
15
 For all the experiments we pin down consideration set’s radius, at 0.7  . We have also simulated 
the model with different values of   obtaining similar results. 
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Figure 3: The difference between the total number of firm A’s customers and the 
total number of firm B’s customers as a function of the two underlying opinion 
networks’ average connectivities, 
A
k  and 
B
k . 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) Top panel: Examples of Erdos Renyi networks with 500 nodes and different 
average degrees k . Note that while the first graph is at the percolation threshold and the largest 
cluster has already emerged, the graph is still very sparse. Bottom panel: The contour plot for the 
excess number of customers of firm A over firm B, sA-sB, for a system of 500 customers that evolved 
for 1000 steps. The underlying social networks are Erdos-Renyi random graphs with average degrees 
k  as shown in the axis of the figure. The results are averages of 100 realizations. Consumers’ 
consideration sets’ radius is pinned down at 0.7  . 
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- Case 3: In the regions where the mean degree of both networks is greater than 
one, giant components emerge in both networks. In these regions we have the 
pluralism solution of the consumers’ choices and hence, no noticeable market 
share inequality is apparent. 
Once consumers have purchased products, firms’ managers adapt their locations to 
reflect the pattern of consumers’ preferences. Firms’ managers are assumed to use an 
“unconstrained” adaptive rule that constantly modifies product characteristics in the 
search for more customers. The rule searches for customers using a “win-stay, lose-
shift” algorithm (Nowak and Sigmund,1993; Bendor  et al., 2003; Laver, 2005): if the 
previous move increased market share the manager makes another unit move in the 
same direction. If the previous move did not increase market share, the manager 
makes a unit random move in the opposite direction chosen randomly within the half 
space toward which it now faces.
16
 Managers use no information whatsoever about 
the global geography of the product-characteristics plane. They have no knowledge of 
the ideal point of any consumer but applying recursively the limited feedback from 
their local environment they pick up effective clues about the best direction in which 
to move.   
Once firms’ managers have adapted firms’ positions, consumers readapt and once 
more are active in the opinion-networks/firms which lie inside their consideration 
sets. Then they are again affected by peers’ opinions till their final decision on which 
product to purchase, then firms readapt to the new configuration of consumers’ 
preferences and the process iterates continuously.  
 
3.2 Location choice 
In the previous section we analyzed consumers’ behaviour when their opinions are 
affected by the opinions of their network peers and the effect of this process in firms’ 
market share. Next, we consider firms’ location choice on the product-characteristics 
plane with origin (0,0) assuming that consumer ideal points’ distribution is normal on  
 
                                                 
16
 The manager makes a unit move in a random direction on the first iteration.  
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Figure 4: The average distance d  of the two firms ( ,A B ) from the origin of the 
product-characteristics plane (0,0), as a function of the logarithms of the 
underlying opinion-networks’ average degrees, 
A
k  and 
B
k . 
 
 
 
Notes: (Colored figure) The system consists of 500 consumers whose ideal points/tastes for product-
characteristics are distributed following the bivariate (0,1)N . The distance d  is calculated at the 
end of a 1000 step trajectory, and each point is averaged from 100 realizations. The shaded area around 
the curves represents the standard error in the calculation of the mean value. Consumers’ consideration 
sets’ radius is pinned down at 0.7  . 
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both product-characteristics’ dimensions.17 We check whether certain product 
differentiation patterns emerge.  
Figure 4 summarizes the results of a simulation involving 100 independent 1000-
cycle runs of the system with two firms (A and B) and 500 consumers. To avoid any 
dependence from the initial configuration we discard output from the first 150 cycles 
of each run, before the 1000 cycles were recorded. Figure 4 shows the average 
distance d  of the two firms from the origin of the product-characteristics plane 
(0,0) calculated at the end of a 1000 step trajectory, and each point is averaged for the 
100 realizations. The shaded area around the curves represents the standard error in 
the calculation of the mean value. For each panel we fix the average degree of the 
underlying opinion-network of one firm to either a very large or a very low value, and 
we measure d  as a function of the average degree of the other opinion-
network/firm.  
From the left panels we see that, despite some fluctuations, the firms are moving 
closer to the center of the plane when both their underlying opinion-networks have 
relatively small average degrees, but when the average degree of only one of the two 
networks increases enough ( 100k  ), the corresponding firm moves away from the 
center while the other firm still moves towards the center of the plane. The right 
panels represent the reverse behaviour; if one firm has an underlying opinion-network 
with large average degree and the other one with low, we find again that the one with 
the high degree roams anywhere in the product-characteristics plane, on average 
further away from the center than its competitor. On the other hand, the firm with the 
small average degree network stays close to the center in order to keep its consumers. 
However, by keeping fixed the large average degree and allowing the small average 
degree to increase, we observe that the firm which corresponds to the fixed degree 
systematically moves toward the center of the product-characteristics plane as the 
average degree of the network of its competitor increases, and when the average 
degrees are comparable, the two firms move at similar distances from the center. 
Summarizing, Figure 4 discloses the following scenarios for the different phases of 
the model: 
                                                 
17
 Bivariate random normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one radius of space. 
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- Scenario I: 〈𝑘〉𝐴 ≫ 〈𝑘〉𝐵. In this case, firm B  moves toward the center of the 
product-characteristics plane searching for customers while the firm A  with 
better connected consumers can afford to roam anywhere in the product 
characteristics plane. 
- Scenario II: 〈𝑘〉𝐴 ≈ 〈𝑘〉𝐵. In this case, no firm has a significant advantage over 
its competitor due to the presence of the opinion-network. Therefore, very 
much along the lines predicted by the traditional spatial competition model, 
both firms systematically move toward the center of the product-
characteristics plane. 
- Scenario III: 〈𝑘〉𝐴 ≪ 〈𝑘〉𝐵. In this case, it is firm B  that can afford to roam 
anywhere in the product-characteristics plane when the firm A  with the 
poorly connected underlying opinion-network is hunting customers moving 
towards the highest density of consumers. 
 
Constructively, the different phases of the model show that for the case of strong 
inequality in the density of firms’ underlying opinion-networks, the firm with the 
highly connected network is roaming anywhere in the product-characteristics plane 
away from its origin, despite the fact that this is the location of the highest density of 
consumers. The opposite is true, with the firms approaching the center more often, 
when their underlying networks are weak. The behaviour behind this pattern is easily 
understood if the system is watched in motion (see supplementary videos). Firms’ 
locational moves have no effect in attracting consumers since the result of the 
maneuver is overshadowed by the effect of the network (the existence of links-
connections between the consumers). On the other hand, the absence of opinion- 
networks reproduces the pattern observed in many simulations of two-party systems 
where the agents search for votes in the location of the highest vote densities. 
However, when there is no network-inequality apparent, firms go up against in 
attracting every single potential client, both moving toward the highest density 
location of consumers. In this case, the two firms go to the center of the plane (0,0) 
and attack each other’s customer bases repelling one another from the dead center, 
along the lines predicted by the traditional spatial competition model.  
22 
 
Figure 5: Trajectory of the system with two firms ( ,A B ) for different pairs of 
average degrees, 
A
k  and 
B
k  for the respective underlying opinion-
networks. 
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For clarity, Figure 5 shows the trajectory of the simulated system with two firms (A 
and B), each artificially started at the edges of the product-characteristics plane, 
(−1,−1) and (1,1), with 500 uniformly randomly scattered consumers, for different -
representative for the three phases of the model- pairs of average degrees for the 
underlying networks: 400, 2;  2, 400;  2
A B A B A B
k k k k k k      . 
The first panel shows firm B’s manager systematically moving toward the location of 
the highest consumer densities, while firm A’s manager enjoys the support of her 
customers’ opinion-network and relentlessly zigzags anywhere in the product-
characteristics plane in a highly atypical way (see also this video 
[Figure5PanelA.mp4]). The opposite pattern is apparent in the middle panel (see 
video [Figure5PanelB]), while the bottom panel depicts the traditional spatial model, 
where the two firms go to the center of the plane and attack each others’ customer 
bases head to head (see video [Figure5PanelC]).  
  
4. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature of product-characteristics competition at the 
firm-level by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role 
of consumers’ social networks in the creation of new product characteristics. In the 
evolutionary framework, firms’ competition for market share depends on the 
preferences/tastes of many economic agents that interact and exchange 
knowledge/ideas/opinions, thereby forming complex social networks which condition 
the evolution of the process. The influence of consumers’ social networks in the 
development of new products is neglected in the traditional literature with ‘passive’ 
and homogeneous consumers: consumption is aggregated into economy’s demand 
side and it is reduced to the purchase decision only, excluding social interactions. On 
the supply side, firms’ managers incorporate new characteristics to their products that 
consumers can either buy or not without taking into account consumers’ 
heterogeneous preferences and the role of their social networks.  
Filling this gap, we put forth a product-characteristics competition spatial 
computational model based on complex systems science. Moving away from the 
forward-thinking strategic game theoretic models, we argue that consumers’ 
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boundedly rational behaviour within their opinion exchange networks can result in 
concentrated power nodes in the network structure of the market. We confirm Halu et 
al. (2013)’s finding that the key feature to get the higher share of the overall product-
purchases is the connectivity of the consumers’ opinion networks corresponding to 
different firms.  Regarding firms’ location, we use agent-based modeling to study 
multi-characteristics competition in the evolving market. We are interested in location 
competition among multiple firms in a multidimensional product-characteristics 
environment in which consumers and firms care for more than one product 
characteristic. We show that for the case of strong inequality in the density of firms’ 
underlying opinion-networks, the firm with the highly connected network is roaming 
anywhere in the product-characteristics plane away from its origin, despite the fact 
that this is the location of the highest density of consumers. The opposite is true, with 
the firms approaching the center more often, when their underlying networks are 
weak or when all underlying networks are strong and no firm has a relative advantage 
on this. 
Most of the relevant literature considers consumers’ preferences as exogenous, 
referring to behavioral heuristics as determinants that lie outside the sphere of 
economics (Bowles, 1998). Valente (2012) argues that this assumption is used as a 
justification for aggregating towards a representative consumer and avoiding the 
economic analysis of heterogeneous agents with different preferences. Experimental 
and cognitive psychology empirical evidence shows that preferences are not 
exogenous but rather seem to be constructed during their elicitation (Shafir et al., 
1993) and, furthermore, are influenced by the preferences of other agents (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman et al., 1982). This means that an interested party, 
like a firm competing for customers, might be able to shape consumers’ decisions 
towards a specific option by influencing their preferences or affecting the opinions of 
their peers. Besides, it is well known that a very large share of companies’ 
expenditures is devoted to marketing usually designed to press consumers to adopt a 
particular perspective/opinion of the product.  
In this paper, we demonstrate how consumers’ social networks can be considered the 
link between the supply side of the market (managers’ decision on marketing and 
strategic directions) and the demand side (consumers’ preferences influenced by 
managers’ strategies). In this way, we capture the feedback loop between consumers 
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and firms, namely consumers’ preferences guiding firms’ innovation strategies and on 
the other way around, firms shaping consumers’ preferences by pursuing the 
consolidation of dense underlying social networks. The consumers’ social networks 
are appealing to organizations not only as a low cost way of reaching an audience, but 
also for their increasing penetration into everyday life and decision making due to the 
acceleration of the social media in the web (Sadovykh et al., 2015).  
Our paper is also related to the recent works by Vitell (2003), Vitell (2015), Schlaile 
et al. (2016), Schlaile et al. (2017), Muller (2017) on the role of consumers in 
responsible innovation and demand. This strand of literature illustrates that 
consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality plays an important role in the 
creation and diffusion of responsible innovations. The results suggest that when all 
consumers focus solely on negative characteristics and demand only “responsible” 
products and services then the complex interplay between demand and supply can 
create situations that are inferior to scenarios with fewer responsible consumers. 
Along these lines, our model could easily be expanded to include negative product 
characteristics allowing the identification of central actors that have the power of 
influencing their peers’ opinions towards consuming more responsibly. Our complex 
networks approach may also be appropriate to address the issue of public and 
stakeholder engagement for stimulating responsible innovation (Jackson et al., 2005; 
Chilvers, 2008; Delgado et al., 2010; Owen and Goldberg, 2010; Blok et al., 2015).  
Though we miss the analytical tractability of the relevant theoretical models, our 
simulated results demonstrate the feasibility of agent-based techniques to describe and 
explore firms’ locational choices, as well as the capability of the proposed model to 
further advance the analysis in alternative ways beyond the game-theoretic 
framework. The proposed model should be seen only as a starting point for further 
research on the role of consumers in shaping markets since the real world is far more 
complex than our model with various aspects and factors influencing consumers’ 
decision making.  
One interesting direction for future research might be the extension of our model 
towards considering the role of committed agents i.e. the situation in which a fraction 
of consumers always remains active in one of the networks, never changing its 
opinion (Galam and Moscovici, 1991; Galam and Jacobs, 2007; Xie et al., 2011; 
26 
 
Mobilia et al., 2017; Halu et al., 2013; Masuda, 2015). Likewise, it might be also 
interesting to see whether the assumption of some “iconoclast consumers”, i.e. 
consumers who intentionally behave opposite to the tendencies of their peers, alters 
our results.  
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